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TO JUSTICE IN THE "WAR ON TERROR"

I

lative effect threatens to undermine the fundamental values of
this nation and shift power in ways that -will inevitably lead to a
less just society.
There is no doubt that the Obama administration inherited
a legal and moral morass, and that in important respects it has
endeavored to restore the nation's historic commitment to the
rule of law. But if the administration continues to limit access to
justice and to assert broad, virtually unchecked power on issues of
national security, there is a great danger that the Obama administration will enshrine within the law policies and practices that
support a dangerous notion that America is in a permanent state
of emergency and that core liberties must be surrendered forever.

problematic post-9/11
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.
. .
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INTRODUCTION
Political conservatives have deployed the term "judicial activism" to stigmatize the courts' fundamental power-and responsibility-to invalidate government measures that violate the U.S.
Constitution or laws. These critics contend that, by actively
exercising this core power, courts unduly oversee and overturn
decisions that instead lie within the &,cretion of elected officials.
Unfortunately, there has been less vocal concern about the less
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obvious but greater dangers to our democracy that fl.ow from the
opposite phenomenon, which I will label "judicial inactivism"
or "judicial passivism": the courts' failure even to review-and,
consequently, their failure to remedy-serious constitutional and
statutory violations by elected officials.
The dangers of judicial inactivism are not obvious because
they are couched in rulings that do not substantively address the
violations at issue, let alone expressly reject the legal challenges
on the merits. Instead, the rulings invoke various justiciability
doctrines that preclude the courts from resolving the claims. The
result is that plaintiffs' complaints are simply dismissed, which has
the same practical impact as a negative ruling on the merits: the
plaintiffs receive no relief, the defendants are free to proceed with
their challenged conduct, and no judicial sanction deters. The
justiciability doctrines are judicially created, defined by vague
criteria, and unpredictably and inconsistently applied. Criticsincluding Supreme Court Justices-complain that judges can too
easily invoke these doctrines to reject substantively disfavored
claims without having to rule on the merits.'
Post-9/r r, judicial passivism has blocked review of compelling claims of gross violations of fundamental human rights,
including the rights to be free from torture, forced disappearance, and targeted killing. 3 Judicial inactivism has also effectively licensed the government to engage in sweeping secret
surveillance of our telephone calls and emails without any basis
to believe that we are engaging in any illegal activity, let alone
terrorism. 4 The Supreme Court and lower courts have reviewed
and struck down some important post-9/ r r measures that
unduly expanded government power and restricted individual
freedom. Nonetheless, the courts have held in too many other
cases that challenges are non-justiciable, thus permitting serious
government abuses. The Supreme Court has compounded the

problem by declining to review challenges to lower courts' nonjusticiability rulings.
Under both the Bush and Obama administrations, the government has regularly pressed several non-justiciability arguments to close the courthouse door to compelling claims. It has
argued that plaintiffs lacked standing because they could not
show that they personally suffered a particular type of injuryeven though the plaintiffs had demonstrably suffered severe injuries, thereby warranting judicial redress.5 The government also
has argued that plaintiffs' claims have become moot because the
government had voluntarily ceased the complained-of conducteven though the government maintained the option of resuming
6
it. Finally, and most regularly, the government has argued that
many cases cannot be litigated without an undue risk of revealing
"state secrets" that will endanger national security-even when
there is ample publicly available information to substantiate the
claims and defenses. 7
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CHECKS AND BALANCES: VIGOROUS JUDICIAL REVIEW
OF INVIGORATED EXECUTIVE POWER
Throughout history, during war or other national security crises,
the executive branch has consistently exceeded the outer bounds
of its constitutional power in order to protect our nation's security. Presidents have asserted the power to take any steps they
deem necessary, including steps that violate civil liberties. This
pattern has repeated regardless of political party. After all, it was
no less a liberal icon than Franklin Roosevelt who authorized the
internment of I 20,000 Japanese-American citizens during World
War II. Likewise, both post-9/r r Presidents, despite their partisan and ideological differences, have asserted executive power to
8
trammel individual rights in the service of national security.
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Even assuming that a national crisis can justify the executive
branch's most vigorous exercise of its power to protect the nation,
the judicial branch would then have a countervailing duty to exercise its judicial review power with corresponding vigor, to ensure
that the executive branch does not overstep its power or violate
individual rights. In one of the earliest post-9/r r judicial rulings
about competing claims of executive branch power and civil liberties, federal judge Gladys Kessler stressed these complementary roles of our government's executive and judicial branches:
The Court fully understands and appreciates that the first
priority of the executive branch in a time of crisis is to
ensure the physical security of its citizens. By the same
token, the first priority of the judicial branch must be to
ensure that our Government always operates within the
statutory and constitutional constraints which distinguish
a democracy from a dictatorship. 9
The Supreme Court's I 944 Korematsu dec1s1on has been
resoundingly repudiated because the majority of the Justices
uncritically accepted the government's unsubstantiated assertion
that the internment ofJapanese-American citizens was necessary
to protect national security. Justice Jackson's dissent stressed that
the Court's passive deference did even greater damage to liberty,
equality, and justice than the uI1constitutional executive action.
As Justice Jackson concluded: "A military commander may overstep the bounds of constitutionality, and it is an incident. But if
we review and approve, that passing incident becomes the doc10
trine of the Constitution."
Likewise, if the Court does not review a lower court decision
that in tum has not reviewed constitutional overstepping by military or executive officials, such overstepping approaches constitu232
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tional doctrine. Conduct that the courts do not halt may proceed
unimpeded.1\1oreover, some Justices and others have argued that
accepted practices, even if not affirm.atively upheld by the courts,
could in some circumstances "be treated as a gloss on 'executive
1
Power"' that the Constitution vests in the President. ' In short,
the Korematsu majority's judicial passivity, in exercising an unduly
deferential form of judicial review, greatly damaged constitutional principles. The even more extreme judicial passivity that
this essay discusses, involving no judicial review at all, likewise
greatly damages constitutional principles.

THE SUPREME COURT'S MIXED POST-9/11 RECORD
After the 9/ 1 r terrorist attacks, civil libertarians anxiously awaited
indications of how actively or passively the Supreme Court would
assert judicial review over claims of overreaching by the executive
branch and violations of individual rights. Now that a decade has
passed, with substantial Supreme Court action and inaction, the
Court's record is mixed.
On the one hand, in almost all of the major post-9/r r cases
that the Court has decided on the merits, it has consistently
curbed the government's excesses, subjecting them to meaningful scrutiny and stressing not only the individual rights at stake,
12
but also the essential role of judicial review. The Court set the
tone for its robust judicial review of the executive branch in one
of the first of these cases, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, in 2004. In ringing language, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's plurality opinion
declared:

[A] state of war is not a blank check for the President
when it comes to the rights of the Nation's citizens.
Whatever power the United States Constitution envi233
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sions for the Executive in its exchanges with other nations
or with enemy organizations in times of conflict, it most
assuredly envisions a role for all three branches when
13
individual liberties are at stake.

charge or trial, sweeping surveillance of the electronic communications of U.S. citizens, blanket denial of public and press access
to important court proceedings, arid retaliation against internal
whistleblowing by an FBI employee about security breaches and
espionage within the FBI's counterterrorism programs.

Especially when contrasted with Korematsu, these positive actions
by the Court are cause for celebration.
On the other hand, since 9/ Ir, the Court has also provided
cause for consternation through its inaction. Specifically, the
Court has declined to review a dozen _important cases in which
lower courts had rejected challenges to post-9/r r measures that
unjustifiably expand government power and violate fundamental rights. 14 Although the Justices' decision not to review a case
does not constitute a ruling on the merits, its practical impact is
similar.
Of greatest concern is the Court's failure to review lower
court decisions that have rejected challenges to post-9/r I abuses
not on the merits, but rather on various justiciability grounds,
concluding that there should be no judicial forum for such claims.
\Vb.en the Supreme Court lets these lower court rulings stand, it
is not only declining to exercise its own judicial review power; it
is also authorizing lower courts to continue to deny any judicial
recourse. In short, these cases constitute major exceptions to J ustice O'Connor's bracing words in Hamdi: they do give the executive branch "a blank check ... when it comes to the rights of the
nation's citizens" (and non-citizens).
Of particular concern, the Court has declined to reviewand has thereby effectively authorized-lower courts' failures to
review compelling claims of serious abuses of fundamental rights,
including torture, abduction, forced disappearance, prolonged
incommunicado detention in inhumane conditions, the indefinite military detention of a lawful U.S. resident without criminal

One variant of the non-justiciability theory that has done the
greatest damage is the distorted state secrets evidentiary privilege
that both post-9/II Presidents have regularly pressed. However,
as the term "privilege" signifies, state secrets do not give rise to
a non-justiciability doctrine, and hence should never be invoked
to dismiss a case outright. Rather, along with other evidentiary
privileges such as the privilege against self-incrimination or the
attorney-client privilege, the state secrets privilege is properly
invoked to shield specific evidentiary items from being used in
15
the lawsuit. Nevertheless, this privilege (rarely invoked pre9/r r) has been invoked by both the Bush and Obama administrations with increasing frequency and success as an automatic,
door-closing non-justiciability doctrine. The lower-court rulings
on point have been divided and inconsistent, underscoring the
rampant confusion about the state secrets doctrine, which the
Supreme Court should dispel.
Some courts have dismissed lawsuits that challenge serious
government overreaching even before discovery takes place,
based only on the government's broad, speculative assertions that
the general subject matter involves state secrets. fo. those cases,
the courts did not ask the government to identify specific documents, or even categories of documents, as to which the privilege
should apply. Nor did the courts assess whether the parties could
present their claims and defenses through non-privileged mate-
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The Reynolds Court considered only whether a specific document could be excluded from the litigation because the government insisted that this document would reveal state secrets.
Although the Court accepted the government's argument that the
document should be excluded, the Court stressed that plaintiffs
should be able to establish their case through other governmentprovided evidence. The Court remanded the case so it could proceed based on this other evidence.
Specifically, Reynolds was a tort action brought by the widows of three civilians who had been killed in the crash of an Air
Force plane. The government declined to produce the official
accident report, daiming that the plane was engaged in a "con17
fidential mission" to test "confidential equipment." Although
the Supreme Court excluded the report, it concluded that plaintiffs could prove their case through the testimony of the surviving
crew-members, which the government offered to provide. The
Court stressed that the greater the need for any allegedly privileged material in a particular lawsuit, the more a "court should
probe in satisfying itself that the occasion for invoking the privi18
lege is appropriate." Accordingly, had the Court believed that
the accident report was central to the plaintiffs' claims, it might

well have required the government to produce it. Fallowing the
Supreme Court's remand, the Reynolds litigation did proceed and
ultimately was resolved via a negotiated settlement. Reynolds provides no support for the government's and lower courts' recasting
of the state secrets privilege into a non-justiciability, executive
immunity doctrine.
The misapplication of the Reynolds evidentiary privilege has
apparently resulted from confusing it with a separate, narrow
non-justiciability doctrine that applies only to a particular type
of lawsuit involving a particular type of secret evidence: a lawsuit to enforce a clandestine espionage agreement with the government. The Court has enforced this limited non-justiciability
doctrine in only two cases: Totten v. United States1 9 in 1875 and
0
Tenet v. Do/ in 2005. In Tenet, the Court reaffirmed that t...l-1e
"sweeping holding in Totten," rendering the case non-justiciable
and hence subject to dismissal at the outset, applies only to suits
"where success depends on the existence of [the plaintiff's] secret
21
espionage relationship with the government." The Totten nonjusticiability rule flows from the law of contracts that is the legal
basis for the lawsuits at issue. It reflects the contracts law premise
that a secret employment contract is implicitly conditioned on an
agreement to forego litigation to enforce it. This highly specific
rule is wholly inapplicable to any other types oflawsuits involving
any other types of state secrets.
Even though Reynolds emphasized that "judicial control ...
22
cannot be abdicated to ... executive officers," it did evince
undue judicial inactivism in one key respect. The Court passively
accepted the government's assertions that the accident report
contained state secrets, without independently assessing the
report. Decades later, when the report was declassified, it turned
out not to reveal the asserted "details of any secret project the
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rial, or whether special procedures-such as conducting portions
of the litigation in canze1'a or ex pm'te, i.e., confidential proceedings involving only the judge and the government-could be utilized to safeguard sensitive material.
The Supreme Court has directly discussed the state secrets
privilege in only orie case, in 1953: United States v. Reynolds. The
Court held that the privilege was "not to be lightly invoked" and
that its misuse could lead to "intolerable abuses." The Court also
warned that "judicial control in a case cannot be abdicated to the
. of executive
. offi cers. " 16
capnce
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plane was involved in," but instead what one historian decried as
"a horror show of [governmental] incompetence, bungling and
tragic error." 23
As Justice Douglas observed in the landmark Pentagon
Papers case, government officials regularly engage in the '\:videspread practice" of invoking national security concerris to achieve
the "suppression of embarrassing information." 24 The Reynolds
case illustrates the government's general tendency to exaggerate the national security benefits of secrecy, while overlooking
the significant ways in which an assertion of government secrecy
can actually undermine national security, as well as due process,
accountability, and other essential democratic values. For example, the bipartisan commission that analyzed the intelligence
failures that contributed to the 9/n attacks criticized excessive
government secrecy as one factor. 25
Post-Reynolds developments underscore not only that maintaining secrecy is not always beneficial to national security
interests, but also that courts are fully capable of identifying
and safeguarding materials whose disclosure would pose genuine national security risks. Since 1953, several important federal
statutes-the Freedom of Information Act, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, and the Classified Information Proce26
dures Act -have laid out procedures for confidential judicial
evaluation of materials that the government resists disclosing on
national security grounds. In enforcing these statutes, courts have
permitted disclosure when appropriate and ensured secrecy when
appropriate, including in high-profile terrorism prosecutions.
In four post-9/n cases, the ACLU has asked the Supreme
Court to review lower court decisions that dismissed serious civil
liberties claims based on a distorted version of the state secrets

privilege. The most recent such request was filed in December
2010, in lvlohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan. 27 The Court had not yet
ruled at the time this essay was completed. In the three prior
28
cases, the Court denied review.
The Jeppesen case powerfully demonstrates the misuse of the
state secrets evidentiary privilege to foreclose judicial review and
immunize executive abuses. It also underscores lower court judges'
confusion about this issue. A bare majority of the Ninth Circuit
supported the government's generalized assertion that "tli.e very
subject matter of this case is a state secret." 29 The dissenters correctly concluded that the privilege would warrant dismissal "if
and only if specific privileged evidence is itself indispensable to
establishing either the truth of the plaintiffs' allegations or a valid
defense that would otherwise be available to the defendants." 30
The five plaintiffs in this case were forcibly kidnapped and
flown to foreign sites where they were tortured and detained
incommunicado in inhumane conditions.Jeppesen organized the
flights at the direction of the CIA. The Ninth Circuit dissent
summarized 1,800 pages of "the voluminous public record materials submitted by Plaintiffs in support of their claims." 31
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CONCLUSION
The lower courts have inappropriately invoked non-justiciability
doctrines to decline to review many cases challenging post-9h I
government abuses, and the Supreme Court in tum has declined
to review those rulings. This double-layered judicial passivism has
adversely affected not only many victims of gross human rights
violations, but also our system of checks and balances. Ironically,
these severe costs were stressed even by the narrow majority of
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the Ninth Circuit judges who misapplied the state secrets doctrine in Jeppesen:

.

the guantanamo mess

Denial of a judicial forum based on the state secrets doctrine poses concerns at both individual and structural levels. For the individual plaintiffs ... our decision forecloses
... judicial remedies .... At a structural level, terminating
the case eliminates further judicial review ... one important check on alleged abuse by government officials and
... contractors. 32

*

The Supreme Court should use the pending Jeppesen case to
reinvigorate the judicial review power to curb post-9/r r abuses
by reaffirming that the state secrets evidentiary privilege is not
a non-justiciability doctrine. This would be an important step
toward curbing undue judicial passivism.

have drawn the title of my essay from a well-known passage
in The Great Gatsby:

I

They were careless people, Tom and Daisy-d1ey
smashed up things and creatures ... and let other people
clean up the mess they had made ... .

* This essay is an edited version of a Joseph Story Distinguished Lecture delivered by Judge Randolph at the Heritage Foundation in vVashington, D.C., on
October 20, 2010.
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